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The Summit of Our Ambition? European 
Defence between Brussels and Wales  
Sven Biscop 
When they meet at NATO’s Wales 
Summit in Newport on 4-5 September, 
the European Heads of State and 
Government should not see this as the 
first chapter of a new book, but as the 
next chapter of an existing one. The 
previous chapter was their meeting in 
Brussels last December for the European 
Council. The title of the book is 
European defence. 
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opportunity to go beyond the organizational 
divide and to assess “the state of defence in 
Europe”. Thus is just as the President of the 
European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, 
envisaged it (in his speech at the 2013 annual 
conference of the EDA). And just as he spoke 
at the previous summit, in Chicago, he should 
be the EU voice in Newport.  
 
The recent priorities and achievements (or, in 
certain areas, the lack thereof) of the EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
and NATO demonstrate in fact that only the 
combination of the CSDP and NATO can 
constitute a comprehensive European defence. 
Neither NATO nor the CSDP alone have 
been able to generate all the structures, 
functions and capabilities that a credible 
European full-spectrum force requires. Now, 
however, true complementarity is emerging. 
Increasingly therefore, the CSDP and the 
European pillar of the Alliance have to be 
regarded as a single capacity.  
 
EUROPEAN CAPABILITIES FOR 
EUROPE’S FORCES  
More than two years after the EU launched 
Pooling & Sharing and NATO its Smart 
No. 55 
March 2014 
The European Council made important 
decisions on defence at its December 2013 
meeting and will address defence again in June 
2015. The deadline for many of the taskings it 
entrusted to the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) and the Commission falls at the end of 
2014, hence the state of play ought to have 
advanced considerably by the time of the 
NATO Summit. For the European Heads of 
State and Government therefore, NATO’s 
Wales Summit is not so much a story in its 
own right as another episode in the overall 
story of European defence. It will be a 
platform to address the implications of their 
December 2013 decisions for the Alliance as a 
whole. In other words, it will be an 
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Defence initiative, progress has finally been 
registered. The European Council was able to 
welcome multinational programmes that 
should produce additional European capability 
in key enabling areas: drones, air-to-air 
refuelling, satellite communication and cyber. 
In contrast, Smart Defence has resulted in 
various useful initiatives mostly aimed at 
improving the efficiency of existing capabilities 
and training, but not in any major new 
capability project.  
 
That ought not to have come as a surprise, for 
NATO was always about common defence 
planning and never really about common 
capability development. The NATO Defence 
Planning Process (NDPP) predominantly sets 
targets for the individual nations, which 
traditionally were met (or at least planned for) 
through national efforts. Occasionally, 
common capability projects took off because 
they (also) filled a US need and therefore the 
US was willing to pay for much of the attached 
research and development bill. Then 
Washington could put pressure on the 
European Allies to contribute their share 
through procurement (the F16 programme 
was a good example) and sometimes even a 
pooled capability (the C17-equipped Strategic 
Airlift Capability, for example). Even so, the 
Europeans usually drag their feet, as the 
Missile Defence (MD) and Alliance Ground 
Surveillance (AGS) programmes show. The 
continued decline of defence budgets in most 
European countries has not helped, of course. 
Today the problem is clearly a European one: 
the lack of strategic enablers for expeditionary 
operations. Hence the US is not willing to pay 
for the solution, and nor should it.  
 
The European Allies have to sit together, set 
priorities and act. Unfortunately, such a 
European caucus is exactly what the US has 
always sought to prevent in NATO. No 
wonder then that it has always proved more 
convenient (easier would be an overstatement) 
to find the beginning of a solution to a 
European capability problem in a European 
context. In 1968 already, twelve European 
Allies created the Eurogroup for that purpose, 
followed in 1976 by the thirteen-member 
Independent European Programme Group 
(IEPG). After the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty, both transferred their functions to the 
Western European Armaments Group 
(WEAG) under the aegis of the Western 
European Union (WEU). Today the CSDP is 
the only European forum able to address 
European strategic shortfalls.  
 
But whether NATO or the EU is chosen as 
the institutional venue is not important, 
because these are the same European countries 
anyway. In view of the less than brilliant 
history of the Eurogroup, IEPG and WEAG, 
what counts is that today the actions of the 
Europeans, not just their words, demonstrate 
their conviction that only common capability 
development can solve Europe’s shortfalls in 
the area of enablers.  
 
Through the CSDP, European countries ought 
to go full-out now for the implementation of 
the four multinational programmes that have 
been announced (not forgetting that the 
December 2011 Foreign Affairs Council 
prioritized eight more areas). That means more 
countries have to contribute more fully. 
Capitals should be aware that it is entirely up 
to them whether Van Rompuy will be able to 
announce real progress in implementing the 
December decisions by the time of the Wales 
Summit. The EDA has a vital supporting role 
to play, as has the European Commission, 
which the December 2013 European Council 
consecrated as a key player in European 
defence. European countries would do well to 
make creative use of any contribution the 
Commission can bring, for it is a powerhouse 
without equal in the CSDP or NATO.  
 
NATO, for its part, can quietly shelve Smart 
Defence, which was only created after the EU 
launched Pooling & Sharing anyway. This was 
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hopefully the last instance of the beauty 
contest that led each organization to begrudge 
the other its moment in the spotlight. The new 
priority that the Alliance already announced is 
actually not new at all, but it is exactly right: 
the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). 
Interoperability between European forces and 
between them and the other Allied forces 
requires an intense schedule of exercises and 
manoeuvres. That only the NATO command 
structure can provide. When troops are not in 
operations they train, but if the Alliance for 
public diplomacy reasons want to give this a 
name and a logo – CFI – why not? More 
questionable perhaps is the future of Allied 
Command Transformation (ACT). If the 
Europeans now do as they say, what role 
remains for ACT that justifies maintaining 
such a large structure across the Atlantic?  
 
Here the first dimension of the emerging 
complementarity can be discerned. Common 
capability development is a European necessity 
best addressed through the CSDP. Exercises 
and manoeuvres for both Article 5 and non-
Article 5 purposes are a NATO-wide necessity 
best addressed through the Alliance. In 
Newport, the Heads of State and Government 
can welcome the EU initiative on the former 
and endorse the CFI on the latter.  
 
EUROPEAN DEFENCE PLANNING 
WITHIN THE NDPP  
Accepting that European strategic enablers can 
only be acquired collectively, the European 
Council stated the need for “increased 
transparency and information sharing in 
defence planning, allowing national planners 
and decision-makers to consider greater 
convergence of capability needs and timelines”. 
Furthermore, European countries should not 
only contribute to the big European 
programmes on enablers, but are also 
encouraged to continue pooling and sharing of 
capabilities within the smaller regional clusters, 
in order to maintain significant deployable 
capability in all forces. This is likely to lead to 
many more permanently coordinated, or even 
integrated, multinational capabilities, such as 
European Air Transport Command or Admiral 
Benelux.  
 
The latter example, the integration of the 
Belgian and Dutch navies, has gone so far that 
de facto these countries can no longer do 
national naval planning, for any decision has an 
impact on their cooperation, which neither can 
afford to end; in reality they can only plan 
together. In other words, the Framework 
Nation Concept proposed by Germany and 
now under discussion in NATO – in which a 
group of countries would de facto consider 
their combined capabilities in certain areas as 
one force and do common planning – is 
already happening. It is the logical outcome of 
ever closer cooperation. And it need not 
necessarily happen between one larger country 
with full spectrum forces and smaller countries 
which plug into those forces. It is equally 
possible between countries of similar size, as 
the Belgo-Dutch example proves. It is also, by 
the way, what Permanent Structured 
Cooperation as possible under the Lisbon 
Treaty would have led to had it been 
implemented.  
 
Whatever constellation they choose, one thing 
is sure: European Allies will increasingly meet 
many of the targets set through the NDPP 
through cooperation among Europeans, 
including of course with non-NATO EU 
Member States. Such European cooperation is 
best coordinated in a European context.  
 
Therefore the European Council’s tasking to 
the EDA, “to put forward an appropriate 
policy framework by the end of 2014, in full 
coherence with existing NATO planning 
processes”, is doubly important. On the one 
hand, systematic transparency about plans and 
intentions between individual and clusters of 
European nations must ensure that no 
opportunities for cooperation are missed, and 
that such cooperation addresses all capability 
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shortfalls without creating new redundancies. 
On the other hand, the collective plans and 
programmes that result from it can be taken into 
account by the NDPP, introducing a European 
level (including all EU Member States, whether 
they be NATO Allies or partners) between 
national defence planning and the ambition of 
the Alliance as a whole. The aim is not, 
obviously, to create an “EUDPP” parallel to the 
NDPP. Simply, all countries can systematically 
share all the data with the EDA that they 
compile for the NDPP anyway, plus their long-
term plans and intentions, both national and in 
cooperation with other European countries.  
 
While the EDA does not need to deliver on this 
tasking until the end of 2014, the Wales Summit 
could already endorse the principle of a “policy 
framework” elaborated through the CSDP and 
incorporated into the NDPP. Thus in planning 
as well complementarity could emerge, with 
NATO in charge of the Alliance and national 
levels of the NDPP, and the CSDP of the 
European level.  
 
EUROPEAN STRATEGY FOR NATO AND 
THE CSDP  
Ideally, the introduction of a European level into 
the NDPP would result in an iterative process. 
The objective is not only for NATO to be able 
to integrate into the NDPP which part of the 
targets to be met collectively by Europeans, 
either through large-scale European 
programmes or through regional clusters, 
instead of by nations individually. In addition, 
Europeans should aim to shape the NDPP 
targets themselves, by identifying the level of 
ambition of the European pillar of NATO / the 
CSDP as a security provider.  
 
This has become a necessity because as recent 
crises demonstrate, with the US focusing on 
Asia and the Pacific, military intervention in 
Europe’s broad neighbourhood (Libya, Mali), 
and even beyond (the Central African Republic), 
is increasingly likely to be initiated and the core 
of the force provided by Europeans. Rather than 
the Alliance as a whole, more often European 
Allies and partners will act in such non-Article 
5 contingencies. Therefore, Europeans have to 
decide what they want to be capable of 
without relying on the national assets of the 
non-European Allies. Europeans can initiate 
military action directly in a NATO or CSDP 
framework, but national action and ad hoc 
coalitions, with NATO and/or the CSDP 
possibly coming in at a later stage, are equally 
viable. Whichever option is chosen, the 
political and economic instruments which only 
the EU can provide will be indispensable to 
obtaining long-term peace and stability; the 
military instrument is but a catalyst. Therefore 
all European military interventions in 
whichever framework should coordinate as 
closely as possible with the EU. In many 
contingencies, such as the crisis in Ukraine, 
diplomacy rather than the military will be the 
instrument of choice. In such cases, the 
continued commitment to Article 5 provides 
Europeans with the confidence that any threat 
to their own territory is being deterred, thus 
creating freedom of action for their diplomatic 
and economic instruments – but NATO itself 
is not the channel for those.  
 
Indeed, the level of ambition for Europe as a 
security provider must be set in function of 
which foreign policy objectives Europeans 
decide to pursue collectively through the 
external action of the EU (both via the 
European External Action Service and the 
Commission). The conclusion is obvious: it 
only makes sense to elaborate and adopt such 
a strategic framework at the EU level. This 
does not prejudice whether in a real-life crisis 
Europeans will act through NATO or the 
CSDP – or nationally – the circumstances and 
the politics of the crisis will determine which 
action is advisable and who is best placed to 
undertake it.  
 
Actually, the High Representative, Catherine 
Ashton, already provided a large part of the 
strategic vision in her preparatory report for 
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the European Council. Europe needs strategic 
autonomy (read, the capacity to act without the 
US); which starts in its broad neighbourhood to 
the east and the south, including the Sahel and 
the Horn (to which one could add the Gulf); 
where it has to be capable of power projection; 
with partners if possible but alone if necessary; 
in order to protect its interests. The soon-to-be-
adopted EU Maritime Security Strategy will 
contribute another part of the answer. The 
engagement in the Central African Republic 
could be seen as an indicator of a third tier of 
responsibility, after taking the lead in securing 
the neighbourhood and contributing to global 
maritime security: contributing to the collective 
security system of the UN, especially when the 
Responsibility to Protect is invoked.  
 
Ashton’s statement, which apparently elicited 
little or no negative comment from the Member 
States, would constitute the clearest political 
guidance yet on Europe’s ambition as a security 
provider. On such a basis, European needs in 
the area of enablers could be quantified and an 
ideal capability mix could be elaborated. This 
would not only frame work on the currently 
identified priority projects, but could also be 
used to launch a reflection now about where 
Europeans collectively want to be in 20 to 30 
years.  
 
The NATO Summit could welcome an 
ambitious European statement in the sense of 
Ashton’s report. That would be a strong political 
signal that Europe will assume responsibility, to 
the US, which can more confidently focus on 
Asia, but also to Europe’s neighbourhood, 
which can trust European commitment to its 
future not to end where security problems begin. 
The complementarity is obvious: foreign policy 
strategy and a security strategy derived from it 
ought to be elaborated through the EU; the 
latter’s translation into defence planning is a task 
for NATO and the CSDP jointly. Finally, 
through the guarantees enshrined in Article 5, 
NATO allows the Europeans to assume the 
responsibilities that they prioritize with 
confidence.  
A NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR 
EUROPE  
Together with Article 5, the NATO command 
structure remains the core of the Alliance and 
therefore the key to its continued relevance. 
NATO has an excellent service to provide: the 
command and control of military operations. It 
will ensure its legitimacy and funding by 
consolidating and even improving its excellent 
performance in that field.  
 
In many scenarios when Europeans decide to 
take military action, they will need a NATO 
headquarters. Indeed, only the Europeans need 
NATO to conduct their military operations. 
Whether anybody will make use of the 
command structure depends on whether 
Europeans can forge a strategic consensus on 
their responsibilities as security providers. If 
they don’t use it, nobody will. Europeans must, 
however, have the certainty that the command 
structure is available when they require it. 
Unfortunately, the latest operation for which a 
NATO headquarters was activated, the 
intervention in Libya in 2011, showed that this 
is not necessarily the case. Only under heavy 
pressure from the US did a reluctant Turkey 
give way and abandon its opposition to a 
NATO role in the crisis. This is a major 
concern, coming just as the US expects the 
European Allies and partners to take the lead 
in stabilizing their increasingly volatile 
neighbourhood.  
 
Much more than any other partnership or 
potential membership therefore, Cyprus’ 
recently announced bid to join the Partnership 
for Peace ought to be high on the agenda of 
the Wales Summit. In return for a 
normalization of Cyprus’ relations with the 
Alliance, an arrangement could be concluded 
between Turkey and the EDA, following those 
with Norway and Switzerland. This would go a 
long way to overcome some of the political 
blockages that so often prevent the Alliance 
from tackling the real issues.  
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CONCLUSION  
European defence: the story is not a cliff-
hanger, but it’s not pulp fiction either. Having 
set ambitious objectives, Europeans must 
prove that they can deliver. All the instruments 
are at hand, in the EDA, the Commission, and 
the capitals. NATO’s Wales Summit will be an 
opportunity to put into action the implications 
for the Alliance of the decisions that the 
European Allies and partners / the EU 
Member States took at the European Council 
last December, and to take stock of progress 
while looking ahead to the next major deadline: 
the June 2015 European Council. The plot 
thickens.  
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